One of the primary supporters of the antismoking push for SmokeLess States is (or was) the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF). Note that according to the Foundation's website, "Robert Wood Johnson devoted his life to public service and to building the small, but innovative, family firm of Johnson & Johnson into the world's largest health and medical care products conglomerate." According to How Products Are Made :: Volume 3: Nicotine Patch, "In early 1996 the FDA approved a patch containing nicotine for sale without a prescription. The first brand to be marketed under this new Over The Counter (OTC) regulation was Johnson & Johnson's Nicotrol®." Also, from a Europa press release dated 11/12/2006, "The European Commission has cleared under the EU Merger Regulation the proposed acquisition of Pfizer's consumer healthcare business ("PCH") by Johnson & Johnson ("J&J"), subject to conditions. The Commission found that the proposed transaction as initially notified would give rise to competition concerns in three product areas: topical dermatological antifungals in Italy, daily-use mouthwash in Greece and nicotine replacement therapy ("NRT") products in the EEA." Now look at how Spending on Lobbying Thrives: Drug and health products industries invest $182 million to influence legislation and compare spending by the trade group, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) to the individual pharmaceutical companies. Notice that PhRMA spent the most at 104. million--three times as much as the other trade group. But, look at Johnson and Johnson and Pfizer: J&J spent 32.8 million and Pfizer spent 62.2 million. J&J recently bought Pfizer. Combined they (now the one) spent 95 million! J&J spent almost as much as the biggest trade group!

Sheesh. It's really mind-boggling isn't it? Look at how well they've indoctrinated the American Public with their marketing. Is it any wonder? Then again, for crying out loud, people once made a living just by selling Pet Rocks! Evidently, marketing works.

Not surprisingly, the suspicions are mounting, as evidenced by this blog from a nonsmoker, "Smoking bans: Good public policy? Or simply a great pharmaceutical marketing plan?", which is dated February 23, 2007.

Smoking bans have been followed by economic hardships for most states and some states have attempted to regain some of the economic losses through higher taxation of tobacco products. This measure was strongly encouraged by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's SmokeLess States program, which is now defunct. The 2002 "Strategic Thinking on State Tobacco Tax Increases" from the SmokeLess States programs reported, "For the most part, this unprecedented success [in raising cigarette taxes in 21 states] can be attributed to state fiscal crises resulting from the downturn in the national economy. State policymakers were desperate to find new revenues to plug growing deficits in state budgets." One interesting quote from a guest column in the Philadelphia Inquirer written by RWJF President and CEO Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, "We need to tax cigarettes high enough to make smokers (especially kids) think twice about what it costs to smoke. Pennsylvania smokers are taxed about only half ($1.35/pack) what their neighbors in New Jersey are ($2.58/pack)." Now, unreasonable taxation is coupled with government intrusion limiting business rights and personal freedom--and all of these measures are justified by "health studies" biased by antismoking fanaticism primarily funded by pharmaceutical interest, i.e., drug money. However, raising sin taxes to fill budget holes is frowned upon by economists as evidenced in "Relying on sin taxes reveals the contradictions in the state budget" from the Washington Policy Center.

The 2004 stock holdings of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation included quite a bit of Johnson & Johnson common stock. However, following the money trail (from pharmaceutical companies to smoking bans) can prove tricky and the connections of the Board of Directors for RWJF to Johnson & Johnson can be difficult to ferret out. Moreover, the role played by some charitable organizations and the pro-ban organizations in various states to lobby (because laws prevent lobbying on the part of certain entities) is difficult to ascertain with any degree of precision. Also, indirect advertising--such as the American Cancer Society advocating nicotine replacement therapy and drugs, and number 4 of Surgeon General's quit smoking campaign, "Get Medication and Use It Correctly", advocating nicotine patches among other things-is a cloudy issue.

To accomplish [its] goals, [RWJF] sought applications from statewide coalitions made up of organizations such as the health voluntaries (the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association), state medical societies, hospital associations, and others. The coalitions were to conduct public education campaigns, strengthen prevention and treatment capacity, and advocate for tobacco-control policies. To encourage collaboration among the various organizations working on tobacco control within a state, the Foundation allowed only one coalition per state to apply.

Recognizing that state coalitions were in various stages of readiness to take on this work, the Foundation offered two types of grants under the program: a two-year capacity-building grant and a four-year implementation grant. The Foundation staff expected to award ten capacity-building grants averaging $200,000 and eight implementation grants, ranging from $500,000 to $1.2 million each.

To help the Foundation and the NPO staff assess and select grantees, a National Advisory Committee was created. Joseph Califano, the former secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, served as its first chairman. With the guidance of the National Advisory Committee and the NPO, the Foundation selected nineteen state coalitions for funding: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, Vermont, and West Virginia, each of which was awarded an implementation grant, and Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington, which received capacity-building grants. Most of the coalitions were housed in one of the three major health voluntaries; two were housed in their state's medical society.

These coalitions, which began their SmokeLess States grants in 1994, addressed tobacco use in different ways. Some focused on educating the public, others on involving young people, still others on public policy; many coalitions worked on a combination of approaches simultaneously. Alaska's coalition, for example, capitalized on the Iditarod dogsled race, working in partnership with event organizers and sponsoring a dogsled musher to educate Alaskans about the harms of tobacco use. New Jersey's coalition concentrated on increasing public support for raising tobacco excise taxes. It used its grant resources to educate the public about tobacco-related harm and the positive impact that higher tobacco taxes have on deterring youth use.

As the coalitions matured, it became clear that they needed assistance understanding the difference between advocacy and public education, which they were legally permitted to do with Foundation funds, and lobbying, which they were not. To make sure that grantees did not violate the prohibition on lobbying with Foundation funds, the Foundation and the NPO provided training and guidance on the difference. In general, direct lobbying involves communications to a legislator reflecting a view on specific legislation while grassroots lobbying involves a communication with the members of the general public that encourages them to take action on specific legislation. Neither type of lobbying can be done using Foundation funds. Advocacy, that is, educating policy-makers and the community generally about issues and the measures that can be taken to address them, is not lobbying.

Since the difference is not always crystal clear, the charge of lobbying can be used as a threat by those who oppose what a foundation and its grantees are doing. A case in point occurred in Colorado. The grantee in that state, the Coalition for Tobacco-Free Colorado, was interested in conducting a media campaign to educate the public about the benefits of increasing the price of tobacco as a way to reduce smoking. (A tobacco tax increase was to appear on the November 1994 ballot.) Shortly after an invitation to bid on the contract for the media campaign was sent to various firms, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation received a letter from Covington & Burling, a wellknown Washington, D.C., law firm that represented tobacco companies. This letter, addressed to the Foundation's proposal manager, Ed Robbins, suggested that the Foundation's support for the Colorado coalition crossed the line into activities that were prohibited under the Internal Revenue Code. The letter stated in part:

Given the sponsors, the context and the timing of the proposed media campaign, there is at the very least a substantial risk that the campaign will fail to qualify as an "educational" activity, or as "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research," within the meaning of the relevant statutes and Treasury regulations. This, obviously, could have adverse tax consequences for the foundation. More to the point, our clients and we would strenuously object to any use of private foundation funds to support what can fairly be viewed here as a lobbying effort, either expressed or implied. This would adversely affect the interests of our clients, and it would also be contrary to the public policies reflected in the Internal Revenue Code restrictions on the use of tax-deductible funds for legislative activity.

After consulting with Sidney Wentz, the chairman of the Board of Trustees who was himself an attorney, and J. Warren Wood, the Foundation's general counsel, Robbins responded with a brief assurance that the Foundation's funds were being used in accordance with the law. In December 1994, another letter, addressed this time to Wentz, was sent to the Foundation from a congressman representing a tobacco-producing state. The congressman appended to his letter copies of his correspondence with the Internal Revenue Service questioning the Foundation's tax-exempt status and requesting that the IRS investigate the Foundation's use of resources, particularly its tobacco-control investments. Wentz answered the letter, explaining that the Foundation prohibited the use of its funds for lobbying. No Internal Revenue Service action was forthcoming.